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Every major industrial accident such as Piper Alpha disaster, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, BP 
Texas City Refinery led to the development of new regulations. After the BP Deepwater Horizon 
accident, several investigation committees recommended to reexamine the United States’ 
existing regulatory approaches by integrating more sophisticated risk assessment and risk 
management practices. It has been observed that this type of reactive changes in regulation 
sometimes give more focus on the causes of a particular accident rather than considering possible 
future hazards unrelated to that particular accident. There are primarily two approaches of the 
offshore oil/gas industry’s regulatory regime; while the United States’ regulatory system is the 
more prescriptive-based, the United Kingdom’s approach is performance-based. The National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Accident 
recommended changing U.S. regulatory regime to a proactive, risk-based approach which could 
be similar to the “Safety Case” approach of the North Sea. The “Safety Case” approach of the 
U.K. is considered successful in minimizing accidents in the North Sea region. The objective of 
this study is to perform an evaluation and comparison between the United States’ prescriptive-
based regulatory approaches and the United Kingdom’s performance-based regulatory 
approaches to understand their advantages and disadvantages. Then, this study presents an 
analysis of major accident histories under both regulatory regimes and discusses their 
effectiveness in reducing accidents. The study has found that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages in both the regulatory regimes and with available data, it is difficult to conclude 





1. Introduction:  
 
The offshore oil and gas drilling, exploration and production in different parts of the world 
has fueled the growth of world economies. The North Sea in Europe and the Gulf of Mexico in 
the Americas are two main locations for offshore oil and gas activities.  In the United States, 
offshore oil and gas activities contribute for about 16% of the crude oil and 5% of natural gas 
(Muskal, 2015). Offshore drilling involves hazards and risks due to exposure of flammable and 
combustible substances, harsh weather conditions, human error, etc., and therefore safety is one 
of the major concerns. There are numbers of catastrophic accidents from offshore drilling and 
exploration activities which had significant impact on people, environment and society, and 
financial loss. The North Sea experienced 123 fatalities in the Norwegian side when a drilling rig 
overturned by a bad storm in 1980. In 1988, the Piper Alpha oil production platform in the U.K. 
side of the North Sea was destroyed due to an explosion resulting in 167 fatalities. This is 
considered as the ‘worst’ accident in the history of offshore oil/gas activities and changed the 
fundamentals of the regulatory regime in the North Sea region. The United States experienced 
significant oil spill incident in 1969 from the Santa Barbara Oil Spill, which is recorded as third 
largest oil spill incident in the drilling history of the U.S.A.  There were about 509 recorded fire 
incidents in the Gulf of Mexico platform from 2006 to 2010 that caused fatalities and injuries of 
the workers (Olsen and Langford, 2010). The Deepwater Horizon accident, described as the 
worst environment disaster, occurred in 2010 at the Gulf of Mexico resulting into 11 deaths and 
17 serious injuries followed by approximately 5 mm barrels of oil spills in 87 days (U.S. CSB, 
2012). The oil spilled from the accident reached several hundred miles of the shorelines and had 
a disastrous impact on the marine and wildlife habitats.  In Canada, 84 personnel were killed in 
an accident in the Coast of Newfoundland, Canada. In Australia, about 2,000 barrels of oil was 
spilled per day for continuous 74 days at the Timor Sea from the Montara oil spill incident in 
2009. Other major oil and gas producing nations, such as Nigeria, Mexico and Brazil, also 
experienced blowout and spill incidents during offshore oil and gas activities which also 
involved numbers of fatalities and serious injuries. Oil and gas is the major source of energy and 
offshore drilling, exploration and production activities are vital part of it globally. Therefore, it is 
important to manage the hazards and risks in these activities to ensure safety of the public, 
property and environment.  
 
It has been observed that after any major accidents, either in offshore or onshore, there were 
significant changes in regulatory regimes and regulations such as the Piper Alpha accident, THE 
Valdez Oil spill accident, the Texas City Refinery accidents etc. Specially, the Piper Alpha 
accident and the Deepwater Horizon accidents are very important from the regulatory regime 
point of view.  Prior to the Piper Alpha accident, the U.K. regulatory regime was prescriptive. In 
1990, the Cullen report (1990) on the Piper Alpha accident recommended to introduce Safety 
Case (Turner, 2013).  Implementation of this recommendation transformed the U.K.’s regulatory 
regime into performance based regulatory regime and required the operators to identify potential 
hazards and risks, and design hazard management and control system to keep risk ‘As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable’. In the United States, offshore regulations are mainly prescriptive. The 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011) 
recommended developing a proactive and risk-based performance-based approach similar to the 
“safety case” approach in the North Sea. The United States Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (U.S. CSB) recommended requiring the regulated entity to ensure effective 
operation and management of safety critical elements for minimizing risk to ‘As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)’, similar to the U.K.’s performance based regulatory regime 
requirement (2014). The National Academy of Engineering (NAE) recommended implementing 
a hybrid regulatory system combining limited number of prescriptive element with the goal-
oriented risk management system (2011). After the Deepwater Horizon accident until now, 
significant changes were brought in the regulations and regulatory organizations, but the 
character of the U.S. regulatory regime is still prescriptive. 
 
Det Norske Veritas (DNV, 2010) performed a study on identifying key differences between 
the offshore regulatory regime of the United States and Norway. DNV (2010) published a 
position paper on an effective U.S. regulatory regime. Dagg et al. (2011) conducted a 
comparison study on the regulatory regimes of Canada arctic, the U.S., the U.K., Greenland and 
Norway. These studies mainly focused on qualitative comparison of the regulatory regimes and 
regulatory authorities. The present study is intended to review the prescriptive and performance 
based regulatory regimes in the U.S.A. and the U.K. respectively. The objective is to conduct a 
quantitative comparison between these two regimes to verify their effectiveness in improving 
process safety of the offshore oil and gas industry. The article briefly describes the key 
characteristics of these regulatory regimes. Then, an analysis of available offshore incident data 
in these two countries is performed.  
 
2. Regulatory Regime in the U.S.A. and the U.K.  
 
Offshore regulatory regime can be categorized into two types:  
 
• Prescriptive regulatory regime. 
• Performance-based regulatory regime. 
 
In the prescriptive regulatory regime, the regulated entity has to comply with certain 
technical and procedural requirements set by the regulator. Under the prescriptive regulatory 
regime, the regulator’s function is to ensure that regulated entities comply with specified 
requirements. This regulatory regime limits regulated entities’ commitment to take proactive 
actions to increase the safety beyond compliance (Det Norske Veritas, 2010). Prescriptive 
regulation might be more useful where setting mandatory specification on safety equipment 
design or procedures or technical standards is required. Also, it would be appropriate where 
requirements should not differ depending on circumstances or the location. Dagg et al. (2011) 
stated that the prescriptive regulatory regime is particularly applicable where the best practices 
can be clearly defined, there is little need for innovation and where a discrepancy with 
requirements could generate huge risks to the environment or human health. Prescriptive 
regulations are driven by consequences based approach which may restrict application of new 
technology, practice and reduce responsiveness to unique or changing circumstances.  
 
In the performance-based regime, regulated entity has the flexibility in determining the 
technical and procedural approach to control hazards. In this approach regulators responsibility is 
to ensure the regulated entity has identified hazards properly and adequate measures have been 
planned or taken to reduce the risk. There is a steady increase in the use of this regulatory regime 
because the regulated entity can consider credible risk scenarios for design and can adopt 
required program and procedures, and use new technology to minimize risk exposure to public, 
property and environment. It allows cost-effective design in comparison to the prescriptive 
requirements. It advocates innovation which can contribute to safer systems and a more proactive 
approach by companies to identify the issues. The regulated entity also assumes more 
accountability. One disadvantage of performance-based approach is that the explanation and 
interpretation of the desired performance levels in the regulation can be complex and 
challenging.  
 
The regulatory regime in the U.S.A. is primarily prescriptive. The regulations have specified 
requirements to equipment, operations, pollution prevention, training, audit and inspection, 
exclusion zones, personnel safety and health, workplace safety, hazard and fire control 
equipment, etc. The regulatory regime in the U.K. is primarily performance-based. The operator 
has to demonstrate the risk is reduced to ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ during project life-
cycle instead of complying with certain requirements.   
 
In the U.S.A., prior to the Deepwater Horizon accident, Mineral Management Service 
(MMS) was responsible for the offshore mineral exploration and development under the primary 
legislation, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). After the Deepwater Horizon 
accident in April 2010, the MMS was renamed to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE). Then, Natural Resource Revenues (ONRR) was 
separated from the BOEMRE and then BOEMRE was divided into the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). The 
US Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) and US Coast Guard (UCCG) also have 
jurisdiction on the offshore oil/gas activities specifically on environmental aspects and safety of 
life, property and navigation respectively on the outer continental shelf facilities.  
 
In the U.K., the Health and Safety Executive (U.K. HSE) is the regulatory authority that 
responsible to manage the health, safety and environmental risks from offshore oil and gas 
activities and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is responsible for oil spill 
planning along with licensing, exploration and development of oil and gas activities in the U.K. 
offshore under the Petroleum Act 1998.  
 
Before the Deepwater Horizon accident, the U.S.A. regulations did not require establishing a 
management program for managing safety and environment aspects of offshore operations. The 
participation to the Safety and Environment Management Program (SEMP), based on API RP 
75: Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management 
Program (SEMP) for Offshore Operations and Facilities, was voluntary and there was no 
mandatory requirement to systematically identify and manage the risks. The regulatory 
requirements are mainly based or worst-case scenario or consequence, not risk based. After the 
Deepwater Horizon accident, U.S.A. first enacted Workplace Safety rule in 2010. With the new 
regulations, the SEMP was made mandatory which requires establishing a safety management 
program. Regulators and regulated entity share the responsibility, where regulated entity is 
required to comply with set criteria or requirements and regulators are required to review and 
approve. The U.K. regulatory regime was shifted from prescriptive to performance based 
regulations following the implementation of the Lord Cullen report (1990) recommendation. 
Therefore, the approach is risk based, different from the U.S.A. approach. 
 
Under the prescriptive regulation, it is difficult to cope with technological advances and to 
incorporate new technologies or techniques for ensuring better safety and risk management. 
Also, in some cases, it becomes very expensive to comply with prescriptive regulation since it is 
based on worst-case scenario. It allows the companies to employ new techniques and 
technologies for offshore oil/gas activity by demonstrating how risk is managed to practicably 
achievable low level. As it is risk based, the companies have to consider only credible scenarios 
and therefore it could be less expensive to achieve target risk level. 
 
In the U.K. operator has to submit an argument, ‘Safety Case’, describing identified hazards 
and risks, setting practicably achievable goals in risk reduction and illustrating the mitigation 
technique in reducing risk “As Low As Reasonable Practicable” continuously throughout life-
cycle of the project. The companies also have the flexibility to adopt international standards or 
recommended practice and demonstrate the design of the safety critical elements can achieve the 
required performance standard.   
 
3. Comparison of Regulatory Regimes in the U.K. and the U.S.A.   
 
Company under the U.K. regulatory regime has to report injuries, diseases and dangerous 
occurrences to the U.K. Health and Safety Executive under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases, 
and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 (Blakstad, 2011). The U.K. HSE publishes 
offshore workplace incident data every year. The definitions of major accidents, dangerous 
occurrences and reportable gas incidents are specified in the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases, and 
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 (U.K. HSE, 2013a).  
 
One of the main successes of the U.K. regulatory regime is to keep the fatality rate very low 
in the U.K. offshore oil and gas drilling and operation activities. From 2008-2014, there was no 
fatality from 2008-2011 and in 2013. There were 2 fatalities in 2012 and 1 in 2014. Fatality data 


















Figure 1: The Number of Fatalities in the U.K. Offshore Oil/Gas Activities from 2008-2014 
 
Figure 2 presents number of incidents resulting in major injury, hydrocarbon release and 
dangerous occurrences in the U.K. offshore oil/gas activities. The U.K. has seen improvement in 
total number of recordable incidents from 2008-2014. But the number of incidents resulting in 
major injury and hydrocarbon release are fairly constant in this period. The dangerous 
occurrences, such as well blowout, failure of blow-out preventer, failure of over-pressure system, 
damage of pipeline or failure of pipeline isolation device, electrical incidents, unintentional fire, 
explosion or ignition, release of biological agents, malfunction of radiation generators, 
malfunction of breathing apparatus, failure of lifting equipment, or structural collapse etc. as 
defined in the Reporting on Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 













































Figure 2: The Total Number of Incidents in U.K. Offshore Oil/Gas Activities Except 
Fatality from 2008-2014 
 
 
The U.K. HSE took Key Program 1: Hydrocarbon Release Campaign which resulted in the 
significant reduction in the number of major and significant hydrocarbon release incidents (U.K. 
HSE, 2001). From 2004-2007, the U.K. HSE ran Key Program 3 (KP3) project in which it 
reviewed maintenance management of safety-critical elements (SCEs) of 100 offshore 
installations and found that the condition of at least 50% of the installations was ‘poor’. In 2008, 
the U.K. HSE undertook a project to review the progress by the industry on the issues reported in 
KP3 findings and figured that good progress was made by the industry, but there was scope for 
continued effort and improvement.  
 
From figure 1 and 2, it can be concluded that though fatality rate is low, incidents happen 
regularly in the U.K. offshore oil and gas activities. Also, there was no major accident happened 
after the Piper Alpha accident in 1988. Therefore, apparently it can be concluded the U.K. 
offshore regulatory regime is successful in minimizing and preventing fatality but less successful 
in controlling the other types of incidents.     
 
In the U.S.A., the regulated entity submits recordable Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 
incidents to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). Figure 3 presents 
number of facilities in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf from 2008-2015 (until 3rd August 2015) 
(BSEE, 2015). There was a large number of fatalities occurred in 2008 and 2010. The large 
number of fatalities in 2010 is mainly due to the Deepwater Horizon accident. The rate of 
fatalities continuously decreased after 2010. The average number of fatalities in offshore 
petroleum activity in the U.S.A. was 4.63 from 2008 to 2015. The average number of fatalities 
from 2008 to 2010 was 8.7 which decreased to 2.2 during 2011 to 2015 after the new regulation 
became effective in November 2010 on the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon accident. 
Mendes et al. (2014) reported that the U.S.A. had the highest fatality records from 2010 to 2012 














Figure 3:  The Number of Fatalities in U.S.A. Outer Continental Shelf from 2008 to 2015 
(3rd August 2015) 
 
 




From figure 4, it is observed that the number of injuries has been decreased from 2008-2015 
(until 3rd August 2015). The average number of injury incident in the U.S.A. was 261.63 and 
there was no significant change in the average injury data after the change in the regulations until 



















































Comparing with the U.K., the overall rate of injury in the U.S.A. (in Figure 4) is higher than that 
of the U.K. (in Figure 2). But, the available data in the U.S.A. provides the total number of injury 
incidents and does not distinguish between major and minor injuries.  
 
Figure 5: The Number of Incidents of LOWC, Fire & Explosion and Spills of equal or 
more than 50 barrels in the U.S.A. 
 
Figure 5 presents the number of incidents related to Loss of Well Control (LOWC), Fire and 
Explosion, and spill of equal or more than 50 barrels. No. of Loss of Well Control (LOWC) is 
nearly constant every year until 2014. There is an improvement both in the number of fire and 
explosion and spills of equal or more than 50 barrels incidents.  
 
Mannan (2014) stated that there has been 50% improvement in no. of fire and explosion 
incidents during 2008-12 in the U.S.A. Mannan (2014) also reported that blowout incidents in 
the U.S.A. have decreased during 2008-12 while it increased in the U.K. at the same period.      
 
International Regulators’ Forum (IRF) Performance Measure Data (2010, 2011 and 2012) 
has shown that the U.S.A. had the highest major injury incidents in 2010 in comparison with that 
of the U.K., Norway and Brazil. Table 1 presents IRF data on fatalities and injuries in the 
offshore incidents in the U.S.A. and the U.K. It is to note that the total worked hours in the 
U.S.A. was higher than that of the U.K. Also, the major injury rate is higher in the U.K. than that 
of the U.S.A. The U.K. did not have any fatality in 2010 and 2012, but the U.S.A. had fatalities 


























Fatalities Major Injuries  
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
USA 12 3 4 78 38 49 
UK 0 2 0 44 32 46 
Total Hours 
Worked 
USA 194,487,878 129,620,501 122,656,035 194,487,878 129,620,501 122,656,035 
UK 54,531,528 56,501,520 62,848,188 54,531,528 56,501,520 62,848,188 
Derived Rates  
(per million hours 
worked) 
USA 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.40 0.29 0.40 








  Major Loss of Well Control Less than Major Loss of Well Control 
  2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
USA 1 1 1 3 3 3 
UK 0 0 1 1 0 1 
No. of Well 
Related Activities 
USA 1781 1733 1625 1781 1733 1625 
UK 192 164 175 192 164 175 
Derived Rates (per 
100 Well Related 
Activities) 
USA 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.17 0.18 
UK 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.52 0.00 0.57 
 
Table 2 presents loss of well control incidents in offshore of the U.S.A. and the U.K. from 
2010-2012. The U.K. did not have any major loss of well control in 2010 and 2011, but there 
was an incident in 2012 while the U.S.A. had one major loss of well control every year in that 
period. Also, the rate of loss of well control is higher in the U.K. than that of the U.S.A. since the 




The objective of this study was to review the prescriptive and performance-based regulatory 
regime of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and to analyze their 
effectiveness in minimizing process safety related incidents in the offshore oil and gas drilling, 
exploration and production. The study briefly discusses the distinguishing characteristics of the 
two regulatory regimes. Then the study analyzed different statistics available from the U.K. 
HSE, the BSEE and the IRF to understand which regulatory regime is more effective. From the 
available data, it is found that the total number of incidents is very low in the U.K., but the rate 
of incident occurrence is lower in the U.S.A. The amount of activity in the U.S.A. offshore is 
much higher than that of the U.K. Also, the incident rate in the U.S.A. has also been decreased 
after the Deepwater Horizon accident when new regulations were enacted. Therefore, it is 
difficult to conclude whether the prescriptive or performance-based regulatory regime is better 
than the other. Other countries such as Canada has adopted the hybrid approach for offshore 
safety management and Norway has adopted the performance based approach with non-essential 
guidelines and recommended practices. Also, the safety record of Norway offshore oil and gas 
activities are considered very well. In future, process safety indicators related to offshore oil and 
gas activities can be developed. Dagg et al. (2011) already conducted a qualitative comparison of 
regulatory regimes of the Canadian arctic, the U.S., the U.K., Greenland and Norway. A 
quantitative comparison of these regulatory regimes can be performed to understand their 
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